*This story ran in the October 2007 edition of 'Sky Magazine'
To read my Yachting Monthly article on our attack go to Attacked
Bambola
notes on Pirates
In
The
Gulf of Aden
I have read and heard about a lot of ‘safe’ tactics to avoid pirate
attacks, a lot of which I feel is overly optimistic and inaccurate. The
following is based on my own experience earlier this year.
We were attacked and robbed by 3 pirate boats in the Gulf of Aden on
Sunday March 2nd 2003.
Our position was 13*31N 48*24E
It is interesting to note that during the last five years all the attacks
on yachts heading for the Red Sea from Oman have been in a corridor between 47*E
& and 49*E. The distance off shore Yemen does not appear
to make any difference.
We were attacked by 3 old ships lifeboats the sides of which were raised
by blue plastic sheeting. The boats were crammed, with what appeared to be very
frightened Somalia people.
This description is similar to the description given by yachts attacked
in previous years - sometimes only 2 boats.
The ‘crews/pirates’ of these life boats appeared to be Arabs not
Africans. All the evidence is that
these 3 boats were in the business of ‘people smuggling’ from Somalia to
Yemen. Interestingly all the
attacks in the previous 5 years (except one on a Thursday) happened at a weekend
- Saturday or Sunday. The aborted
attack on the fleet of five boats following us happened one week later -
Saturday - The next aborted attack this year was the following weekend.
There was absolutely no evidence of the pirate boats having VHF and they
certainly did not have HF radios. We
were attacked at dawn and I am certain they were following our navigation lights
- both Josephine and Bambola were exhibiting masthead tri-colour lights.
Although the pirates fired rounds at both boats (hitting a shroud on
Josephine) they were not interested in harming us physically.
Certainly we were threatened with loaded guns but their interest was -
Cash (US $’s), Radio equipment - carefully removed, binoculars (they asked
where they were) and wrist watches. They
did attempt to remove the solar panels but they were too well bolted on.
They were not interested in other things - no demands for credit cards or
passports or cameras. They were in
a hurry to get in, grab the swag and get out.
CONCLUSIONS
The attack was opportunistic.
I am certain these boats were heading for the Yemen out of Somalia and
happened to see our navigation lights before dawn and stalked us. (I know many
yachts practiced radio silence or coded waypoints. I do not believe these ‘pirates’ have the ability,
direction finding equipment or indeed VHF radios to track radio transmissions.)
Traveling in a group will not deter them.
There were 6 yachts in the group that was attacked the following weekend.
The pirates gave chase. If they had not been able to outrun the pirates
and one boat had been boarded by armed men what would the crews of the other
yachts have done? When gunmen are
firing Kalashnikovs - AK47s and machine pistols towards you there is not much
point in resistance. The next attack was also on a group of yachts and the
pirates only gave up when an American aircraft buzzed them in response to a
Mayday.
The distance off shore Yemen is irrelevant - Do not go near the Somalia
coast - a merchant ship was robbed, with loss of life, around the same time near
to this coast.
It could be worth considering sailing without navigation lights whilst in
the danger zone.
It could be worth avoiding transiting the danger zone at weekends.
Personally I would not carry guns to defend myself with.
I would have to be a very good shot to avoid hitting the innocent
passengers in the pirate boats. I also wonder if the pirates would run or just
return fire that would outgun most yachts.
I think it worth asking coalition forces for escort.
There is normally a coalition warship in Oman. In the end the Americans
stationed a warship near the danger area and had aircraft regularly over flying
the yachts as they came through. This was a successful tactic although why they
were not prepared to ‘arrest’ the pirates on the high seas, outside any ones
territorial waters, is beyond me.
Only 1% of the yachts heading for the Red Sea are actually boarded and
robbed in any one season - I just hated being that statistic.
Some sort of escort by coalition forces seems to be the only really safe
answer.
Tuesday, 23 September 2003
Michael Briant
SY Bambola Quatre (36ft center cockpit Moody)
La
Rochelle
If you want to read the story as published in YACHTING MONTHLY then go to Attacked
The Following incidents took place in 2004
The following three incidents took place in the waters between Somalia and Yemen the night of 23 February, 2004. Klondike is a US registered sailboat owned by Donald & Kathyrn Radcliffe from Santa Cruz, California.
The first incident happened about 2000 hours local time (GMT 1600) in position 13 degrees 50 minutes North, 50 degrees 05 minutes East. About 1 hour after sunset, and 1 hour before moonset, Klondike was traveling at about 4 knots under sail in 8 knots of wind on a course of 250 true. We were traveling with only a low powered all-around light due to the threat of piracy in the area. We saw a single white light slightly off the starboard bow. Radar indicated a small vessel at 2 miles, and we could see a bow wake as it headed towards us. We responded by turning 40 degrees to port, and the other vessel changed course to intercept us. As the other vessel closed, we turned on the engine, turned on our running lights, turned further to port, and started to accelerate. The other vessel closed to within 50 meters of our starboard quarter, and we could see what looked like a diesel powered boat, 8-10 meters in length, perhaps a ship's lifeboat, with 2-3 men on deck, coming toward the bow. They were clearly trying to approach our starboard quarter, with smoke coming from their diesel exhaust, but we accelerated away from them as our speed increased to 7 knots. They fell in behind us, and we broadcast a Mayday call on VHF channel 16, giving our position and the situation.
The Mayday call was answered by a yacht 12 miles astern, and we advised them again of our situation and position. We extinguished all lights and varied course between 210 and 270 degrees. The other vessel receded behind us, and appeared to break off the chase after about 5 minutes. We came to a course of 210 degrees where the sails assisted our speed, and motor-sailed at 7 knots until the other vessel disappeared from the radar at about 5 miles. The ultimate intention of the other vessel remains unclear, as we were able to avoid contact closer than 50 meters, but it appeared that they were preparing to board us. No weapons were seen or heard.
The second incident took place about 2300 local time (1700 GMT) the same night, in position 13 degrees 39 minutes North, 49 degrees 49 minutes East. While traveling without lights on a course of 250 degrees, we observed a single white light approximately on our port beam, which appeared on radar at 5 miles SSE of our position. By radar, it appeared to be heading on a course to intercept us, so we changed course to 300 degrees, accelerated to 7 knots while motor-sailing, and tracked the other vessel. It continued to converge on us, and we estimated its speed to be over 8-9 knots.
After about 20 minutes, the other vessel was approximately 4 miles astern, so we made a course change to 240 degrees, and accelerated to our maximum speed of 7.5 knots. The other vessel responded by changing course to follow us. After 20 minutes, we repeatedly hailed it on VHF Channel 16, informing it that if it continued to follow us, we would broadcast a Mayday, but got no response. It closed to 3 miles behind us, and we broadcast a Mayday at 2340 with our position and situation on VHF channel 16 and HF 2182 Khz. The only stations to respond to our Maydays were the group of 4 yachts 12-15 miles northeast of us. We requested one of the yachts, Solara, to use his satellite phone to call the authorities. He called Australian Marine Safety Authority (61 2 6230 6811), who told him that they would report the situation to the piracy control center in Kuala Lumpur (60 3 2031 0014), and told him to call back in 30 minutes. We fired 2 parachute flares during this time, which were reported seen by the group of following yachts.
After 20 minutes, the other vessel closed to 2 miles, but had swung in directly behind us, so we again altered course to 180 degrees, allowing us to reach across the wind which had increased to 16 knots, bring our speed to 8.5 knots. The other vessel turned out its lights, making its location more difficult to track, but seem to be falling back slowly on radar. After another 30 minutes we changed course to 140 degrees, slowing our progress to 7 knots, but heading into the waves and hopefully making it more uncomfortable and difficult to follow us. The other vessel did not respond to this latest course change, and disappeared from the radar screen after another 10-15 minutes. We called the yachts following on the VHF and told them to report to the authorities that we were no longer being closely pursued. We held the 140 degree course for another 30 minutes, then changed course to 330 degrees to join the group of four yachts which was following us. We made contact with them about 0130, and had no more incidents the rest of the night.
The second vessel never got close enough to get a visual description, but it was clearly more sophisticated than the first, with a speed of perhaps 9-10 knots, probably radar and VHF radio. It had no problem tracking our radical course changes at a distance of 3-5 miles on a night with no moon. We believe that the combination of the flares, the VHF traffic with the other boats, and their small speed advantage discouraged them from chasing us for more than an hour.
The following morning we were contacted by a helicopter from the Coalition naval forces that had been alerted by Kuala Lumpur, and that afternoon we got a visit from a Spanish warship. A boarding party came aboard to verify that we were not being held hostages and took the details of the incidents. The Spanish warship provided a loose escort our group until we neared Aden. Words cannot express how grateful we were for the escort, as it was through a region where numerous yachts have been attacked in recent years. We had made arrangements to convoy through this dangerous area, but our problems occurred about 80 miles east of the historical attacks.
Was the first boat innocent and curious fishermen, and were we overreacting? Was the second vessel unable to understand English and trying to come to our aid after we set off the flares? We will never know for sure, but when a boat intercepts you at night in lonely waters 60 miles offshore in the Gulf of Aden, we believe it is wisest to assume the worst.
The third incident was the French Yacht Le Notre Dame, who was boarded and robbed by armed fishermen/pirates on 27 February at 13 degrees 30 minutes North and 47 degrees 51 minutes East. The yacht was approached at 1300 local time about 30 miles off the Yemen coast by a small fishing vessel with 5 men on board. The men had knives and automatic rifles, and took cash, cameras, binoculars, and other easily accessible valuables. The crew was shaken but unharmed, and proceeded to Aden. In this case, a Coalition warship heard the relayed distress message on VHF, asked commercial shipping to assist, and responded with a helicopter some 6 hours later.
Communications Both Sailmail and Winlink present challenges in connecting with distance transmitters here in the Red Sea. Winlink with transmitters in Italy and Qatar has been more user friendly. Winlink allows 30 minutes/day per station versus the 10 that Sailmail gives totally. You've got more time to make several attempts at connection to Winlink. Transmitters for Sailmail are located in Belgium, Mozambique and Brunei. Late evening connections to Brunei have given the best results on Sailmail.
Donald & Kathyrn Radcliffe, s/v Klondike
The following is a Reuters report on what is almost certainly the same group of pirates that attacked Bambola and other sailing boats. 2005
Thursday March 10, 11:37 PM 
2005
GENEVA (Reuters) - More than 100 Somali and Ethiopian people are feared to have drowned at sea in the past week while trying to reach Yemen aboard smugglers' boats, the United Nations said on Thursday.
Most perished when a vessel carrying 93 passengers sank on March 3 in the Gulf of Aden after developing a technical problem, the U.N. refugee agency UNHCR said in a statement.
Only the four crew survived, after being picked up by other smugglers' boats who had also set sail the same day from northeastern Somalia, it said.
"They rescued the crew but left all the passengers to drown," UNHCR spokeswoman Marie-Helene Verney told Reuters.
A further 18 Africans are believed to have drowned on March 7 after the crew of another boat ordered its 85 passengers to jump into the sea while some distance from the coast.
"This tragedy is the latest in a series of similar accidents that have caused an untold number of deaths in the past few years," UNHCR said.
A year ago, 100 people are believed to have drowned when a smugglers' boat sank in the same waters, it added.
Thousands of Somalis and Ethiopians each year "fall prey to unscrupulous traffickers" in the hope of being smuggled into Yemen, from where many seek to make their way to Europe, according to the UNHCR.
It said this "growing disaster" had its roots in poverty coupled with insecurity in the case of Somalia, which drives desperate people into smugglers' hands.
"Most of these people are economic migrants but a certain number are refugees," Verney said.
Survivors from the latest incidents, as well as some 450 passengers from other smugglers' boats who also sailed from Somalia at the same time, were intercepted by Yemeni authorities. They are receiving care at Mayfa'a reception center near the coastal village of Bir Ali in southern Yemen.
They told UNHCR staff that some 1,500 people are waiting to be smuggled into Yemen from Bossasso, in northeastern Somalia, in coming days.
Story ends
Sickening to think the pirates just rescued their own - left the women children and passenger to drown!
If you want to read the story of the attack on Bambola as published in YACHTING MONTHLY then go to Attacked
The following report is on Noonsite - March 2005
Here is a firsthand account of a pirate attack on two yachts. It took place only 30 miles off the coast of Yemen at 13°28' North 48°07' East on 8 March 5pm local.
Richard Donaldson-Alves, Controller, Mobile Maritime Net, South East Asian Waters (14,323 MHz 0025 Z daily Wx @ 0055 Z daily)
On 8 March 2005, two sailing yachts, Mahdi & Gandalf, were moving SW 30 miles off the coast of Yemen proceeding to the port of Aden from Salalah, Oman.
At about 0900 two outboard powered boats, about 25 feet long with 3 men in each one, passed off our stern moving south at about 25 knots. An hour or two later they returned, one coming quite close and looking us over carefully. The second boat passed our bows but quite a ways away. These boats were obviously not engaged in a normal activity such as fishing, etc. At that time we were south of Al Mukalla, Yemen. The area around Al Mukalla is well documented as being a piracy problem area and we started watching carefully for anything out of the ordinary. At about 1600 we observed two different boats approaching us head on from the SW. These boats were 25-30 feet long, had higher freeboard and diesel powered. They were coming very fast directly at us. There were 4 men in each boat. The boats separated at about 200 yards, one boat ahead of the other, coming down Mahdi’s port side and firing into the cockpit. The other boat was firing an automatic weapon at both Gandalf and Mahdi from ahead, more at Gandalf. These guys were shooting directly at the cockpits, and obviously intended to kill us. The first boat swung around behind Mahdi’s stern to come up and board us. At that point I, Rod Nowlin aboard Mahdi and armed with a 12 gage shotgun loaded with 00 buckshot, started shooting into their boat. I forced them to keep their heads down so that they could not shoot at us. I am not sure I hit anyone at that point although I could see the driver of the boat crouched down behind a steering console. After firing 3 shots at them their engine started to smoke and I swung around to shoot at the boat ahead. At that point, I saw Jay Barry on Gandalf ram that boat amidships almost cutting it in two and turning it almost completely over. I turned back around to shoot again at the boat behind Mahdi and that is when they turned away from Mahdi and were heading toward the stern of Gandalf. Gandalf was beside us, about 100 feet away. The bow of the pirate’s boat came right up against Gandalf’s stern and two men stood up on the bow to board Gandalf. That was a serious and probably fateful error on their part. I shot both of them. That boat then veered away and I shot the driver, although I am not sure of the outcome because they were farther away and I did not knock him down like the other two.
Mahdi and Gandalf kept going at full speed to put as much distance between the pirates and us as possible. As soon as we were out of rifle range we looked back and both boats were drifting and appeared to be disabled.
If Jay on Gandalf had not had the presence of mind to veer over into one boat and ram it, the outcome of this attack would have been totally different. All they needed to do was stand off a ways and shoot us to pieces with automatic weapons. We were extremely lucky. We broadcast Mayday calls on all VHF and HF radio frequencies, including two HF emergency frequencies supplied by the US Coast Guard a few days before. The Coalition Forces in the area were supposed to be monitoring these frequencies. There was no response except from a commercial ship in the area on VHF 16 who approached and observed the disabled pirates for a bit, then sailed along side of us for 2-4 hours until dark to make sure we would be all right.
The pirates were well organized and well armed. There were at least 4 boats involved. They had set up a picket line out from the Yemen coast probably at least for 50-75 miles, so if you transited the area during the day they wouldn’t miss you. The two boats that attacked us appeared to have come from the south.
There has been speculation in the past that this ongoing piracy problem off the Yemen coast was being carried out by Somali pirates. Given the number, type of boats involved, and the direction the spotter boats came from, this does not appear to be correct in this case. This problem is getting worse and the pirate attacks are getting deadly. One could only expect that the Yemen Government will take more direct action. At the very least, allow yachts to group in Salalah, Oman and at some point on the NW Yemen coast to request an escort along the Yemen coast.
March 11, 2005
Rodney J. Nowlin, USN Retired
S/V Mahdi
Story Ends
I think the above story is very worrying.
Before this incident I believed that although you might get robbed but if you acted sensibly you would not be harmed.
These appear to be a new band of pirates with different fast boats.
Possibly they have been put off by their defeat but if there are any more incidents in this area I would seriously doubt the wisdom of using this route. The American and other Coalition forces are obviously still not interested in monitoring emergency frequencies or providing help.
MEB march 2005
|
has a lot of stories and information about making a circumnavigation There is more information HERE |
http://www.nga.mil/portal/site/maritime/
is the link to the US agency reporting on piracy world wide
A useful link for cruisers to further pirate information is http://www.onpassage.com/Emergency_Medical/Pirate_attacks.htm
Treasure Isle is about pirates it was the show I directed for the BBC little knowing......