Pirates

Both General Teklai Habteselassie, the Commander of the Eritrean Air Force, and Yemane Tesfai, General Manager of the state-owned Commercial Bank of Eritrea, are allegedly on their way to Ukraine in a last minute effort to purchase arms for the air force before the curtain falls over Eritrea. The same sources from Eritrea also state that three higher officials who are on sick leave abroad have been ordered back to the country. They are Alamin Mohammed Said, Minister Berhane Abrehe and Brigader General Futstum (Wedi Memhir). Both events have been triggered by the UN resolution to sanction Eritrea at three levels: arms embargo, assets freeze and travel ban.
Ukraine happens to be the main supplier of armaments to Eritrea. This especially holds true in regard to the air force. Not only has Ukraine been providing the EAF with pilot trainers and technicians, it has also supplied most of its aircraft. The SU-27 is especially believed to be of high maintenance and requiring spare parts on constant basis. The fact that none other than the Commander of the Air Force and the General Manager of the major bank in Eritrea have been sent in a rush to Ukraine has left some government officials in Asmara speculating that the regime is on its last arms shopping spree to procure what it deems to be essentials for the air force before the arms embargo is fully enforced. The government in Asmara dreads any significant advantage in air force on Ethiopia’s side that may accrue as a result of the sanctions.
In light of the Ukrainian connection that is evolving, two events need also to be remembered: First, much of the firearms hauling to Somalia Islamists, including the terrorist organization Al Shabaab that has close connection to Al Qaida, financiered by Eritrea was undertaken by Antonov cargo planes that belong to Ukraine. And second, during the border war, an Ukrainian cargo plane loaded with firearms crashed in the vicinity of Asmara.
The other half of the riddle has to do with huge amounts of money transference between Eritrea and Ukraine that this transaction demands that it required none other than the presence of the General Manger of the Commercial Bank of Eritrea to close the deal. This time around, given the uncertainty of the future, no installments and no periodic payments will do; the cash flow has to be instant. Of course, this is also triggered by the order to freeze assets that belong to entities and individuals that have yet to be identified by the UN. Since much of the arms deal that Eritrea conducts both to arm itself and other terrorist organizations is of clandestine nature, nobody really knows where, how and under what names these transactions have been conducted. The fear on the Eritrean side is that it will be these assets that will be primarily targeted by the UN once the resolution is implemented and the process starts.
And last, since nobody knows who will be included in the UN list of higher officials and military leaders to be banned from travelling outside Eritrea, the government is taking no chances. The fear is that it may include the likes of General Teklai Habteselassie and and General Manager Yemane Tesfai. Given this uncertainty, this rush seems to be one last attempt to beat the clock while the government officials that can make it happen, the wheelers and dealers, are on the loose.
These two officials are highly regarded as competent and very “trustworthy”. Major General Teklai Habteselassie was formerly in charge of Zone 3, then of Sawa Military Training camp for the forced national service and then had the added responsibly of the Eritrean Air Force. He replaced Habtezion Hadgu whose disappearance caused a stir in Eritrea a few years ago. Teklai is also the spouse of Luul Gebreab, Chair of National Union of Eritrean Women (N.U.E.W.) a government propped organization. Yemane Tesfai was an employee of the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia (now Eritrea) and disappeared with money from the bank and joined the E.P.L.F. where he stayed until independence when he became the head of the Commercial Bank.
Another event triggered by the UN resolution is the order from Asmara for Alamin Mohammed Said, Minister Berhane Abrehe and Brigader General Futstum to end their visit in Europe and return to Eritrea immediately. Since the blacklist of higher officials selected for travel ban is yet to be compiled, those who are suspected to end up in such a list are being ordered to head home. Besides, the angst level among higher officials has reached such a hysterical level that the regime is doing whatever it can to prevent any potential defection. The fear is such a defection among the highest officials might cause a stampede to exit at a lower level in its embassies and other foreign-based posts throughout the world.
Both of these developments show that Eritrea is not ready to give in to the demands of the UN and is preparing for the long haul; it is digging in to weather the storm. An already insular country that has instilled the mentality of encirclement on its people is withdrawing fast from international scene. It has already cut off itself from IGAD and AU. And its relation with the UN, since the day it expelled the UNMEE from its land, has been getting from bad to worse.

Uganda: Man Demands Sh4 Billion for Airlifting UPDF by Henry Mukasa (New Vision)
A Dubai-based businessman who said he was contracted to ferry UPDF troops for operations in Southern Sudan and Somalia has petitioned the Inspector General of Government (IGG) over non-payment of $2.3m (sh4.3b).
Sami Haroona Eisa, the director of Stream Aviation and Excel Air International, in a letter to the IGG states that the Ministry of Defence has refused to pay his fees. He also claims the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) has maliciously grounded his aircrafts.
"My current concerns are the high level of sabotage, frustration and intimidation. As I push for my payments from the Ministry of Defence and damages from CAA, I am being threatened with death," Eisa wrote in his petition.
He requests the IGG to intervene "in order for sanity to prevail so that investors like me can gain confidence".
The acting IGG confirmed that his office received the petition. "I recollect I have a communication to that effect," Raphael Baku said in a telephone interview. "I sent it to one of the directorates to verify the truth of the complaint."
MP Abdu Katuntu, the lawyer for Stream Aviation, said he had instructions to recover the money and take the matter to court if mediation fails.
"I have talked to the deputy Attorney General to see how that matter can be settled amicably because it is of a security nature and classified," he said.

In his letter to the IGG, Eisa says his company, Stream Aviation, transported troops and other logistics for the Ministry of Defense to Southern Sudan for the operation against the LRA, which started on December 14, 2008. He says he was contracted by an American company, DynCorp.
"After completing over 30 trips in December 2008, I have not yet received the sum of $2.3m," he said.
He, however, claims that $1.3 (sh2.4b) was "fraudulently" released by the permanent secretary (PS) of the defence ministry to Barnabas Taremwa, a Ugandan he had entrusted with some local operations. The money, he said, was paid based on forged letters.
Eisa also accuses the PS of accepting fake vouchers bearing his signature "scanned from another document".

In a separate deal, Eisa wrote, his other company, Excel Air International, was contracted to fly supplies for the UPDF troops in Somalia.
He claims his planes were vandalised while parked at Entebbe International Airport and he estimates the damage at $1m (sh1.9b).
Excel Air International was reportedly instructed to operate another 10 flights to Southern Sudan in October.
He alleges that CAA refused to clear his aircraft, leaving it grounded "loaded with UPDF cargo to Nzara".
"I have lost the contract from DynCorp due to delayed clearance of my aircraft by CAA. Instead, I am being forced by CAA to work with my rival, Sam Engola (of Showa Aviation)."
The man of Somali origin claims that over 30 men from the Rapid Response Unit (RRU) broke into his residence in Entebbe in February and ransacked it. According to his letter, he was dragged to the Central Police Station in Kampala and accused of robbing a car which he says belonged to him.
"Currently, all my investments are under threat, including my life and my family. Justice delayed is justice denied. I feel I have not been given a fair hearing by the Government agencies," reads his letter.
UPDF spokesperson Lt. Col. Felix Kulayigye yesterday said the ministry never contracted the company to ferry troops to Southern Sudan or Somalia.
When told that the company subcontracted from DynCorp, he replied: "Then their contract is with DynCorp."
The PS, Rosette Byengoma, could not be reached by telephone while CAA spokesman Ignie Igundura said: "I don't want to comment on that group of people. We are already in court."

Do We Need 30,000 Troops in Yemen, or A Better Counter-Terror Strategy? by Tim Fernholz (Newsweek)
When President Barack Obama announced his plan to send 30,000 more troops to Afghanistan in early December, he began by invoking the attacks of 9/11 and explained that fighting al Qaeda was the primary reason for America's war effort, calling the Afghan-Pakistan border "the epicenter of violent extremism practiced by Al Qaeda. It is from here that we were attacked on 9/11, and it is from here that new attacks are being plotted as I speak."
The idea is that transnational terrorist groups require safe havens to prepare their attacks, but the Af-Pak border isn't the only place where terrorists hide. Somalia and Yemen, which Obama also mentioned in his speech, are also home to al Qaeda. We were treated to an object lesson on Christmas Day when a Nigerian man, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, who reportedly obtained explosives from an Al Qaeda contact in Yemen, allegedly attempted to ignite explosives on a Detroit-bound flight before he was subdued by quick-acting passengers.
Some, like Senator Joe Lieberman, are already descending into self-caricature by calling Yemen "tomorrow's war." Indeed, the U.S. has recently stepped up its intelligence and Special Forces presence to bolster the Yemeni government's efforts to drive out Al Qaeda and radical clerics (including one linked to the Fort Hood shootings); last month President Obama ordered cruise missile strikes against terrorist targets there. But, though it is clear that broader engagement, including non-military partnership, is needed to stop with Al Qaeda in Yemen, we shouldn't be looking for another war. Instead, the circumstances of the attack give us an opportunity to reconsider whether the Obama Administration's extensive commitment to the Afghanistan conflict is the right way to go after extremist groups who wish to attack the United States, and whether so-called "safe havens" are really a threat.
This attempted attack does not appear to have any connection to Afghanistan," Paul Pillar, a former deputy director of the CIA's Counterterrorist Center and former National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia, wrote via e-mail. "The incident is a reminder that countering such terrorism is not a matter of controlling particular pieces of foreign real estate but instead of less visible work by intelligence and law enforcement resources."
While there are good reasons for the United States to be in Afghanistan - in particular, keeping Pakistan's nuclear weapons away from extremists and the international commitment to shoring up the faltering government in Kabul - Obama sold the plan as a response to 9/11 even when he had a chance to offer an evolved justification to the American people.
Pillar has previously questioned the assumption that we need to interdict terrorist safe havens with military force in an age when the Internet enables international terrorists to network as efficiently as office workers. Friday's attack didn't come, so far as we know, from Afghanistan or the largely illiterate tribal insurgents there, but from an educated Nigerian man who had lived in England, obtained explosives in Yemen and was screened in two international airports whose security measures were approved by the U.S. Transportation Security Administration.
Newsweek's Declassified blog reports that Abdulmutallab had been entered into a potential threat database following warnings from his father. (He had already been barred from entering the United Kingdom.) However, his name had not yet migrated to the no-fly list, suggesting that despite Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano's Sunday claim that "the system worked," more attention and resources are needed to get U.S. security agencies operating on the same page. With the costs of the already $68 billion-a-year Afghanistan conflict set to rise, it's time for the administration to rethink the balance of resources between military operations designed to shut down terrorist safe havens and the intelligence and law enforcement efforts that could have stopped the incident on Christmas.
(*) Tim Fernholz is a Writing Fellow at the American Prospect

Ask The Expert: Will Yemen Become A Major Al-Qaeda Sanctuary? (RFE/RL)

After a Nigerian national who claims to have trained with Al-Qaeda in Yemen allegedly tried to blow up an international flight on Christmas Day, and following two Yemeni military airstrikes on suspected Al-Qaeda meetings this month, RFE/RL spoke with regional security expert Mustafa Alani of the Dubai-based Gulf Research Center about the Middle Eastern country's role in international terrorism.
RFE/RL: Numerous media reports have suggested that Yemen is emerging as a new Al-Qaeda sanctuary. How serious a threat do you think this new sanctuary poses?
Mustafa Alani: I think we have a huge exaggeration [in suggesting] that Yemen is emerging as an equivalent [sanctuary] to Afghanistan or Pakistan. The list of wanted people on charges [of having ties] to Al-Qaeda is no more than 50 people. But because Yemen faces other challenges at the same time -- the revolt of the al-Houthi [followers of Shi'a cleric Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi, head of the Shi'a Zaidiyyah sect] in the north and separatist movement [in the south] -- it is weakening the government's ability to face Al-Qaeda. But in recent weeks we witnessed two major attacks on Al-Qaeda, which really destroyed a good part of the organization inside Yemen.
RFE/RL: But given that a sizeable number of people in Yemen are sympathetic to Al-Qaeda, and the fact that Yemenis share their language and ethnic heritage with Al-Qaeda leaders such as Osama Bin Laden, do you not think this makes it easy for Al-Qaeda to operate in Yemen?
Alani: Yes, Al-Qaeda thinks that Yemen is an ideal place for a number of reasons -- tribal system, and other factors. But we still believe that Al-Qaeda tried to establish itself in Yemen but not necessarily with huge success. The Yemen organization [of Al-Qaeda] is not only for Yemen, it is for the whole Arabian Peninsula. But I believe that Yemen is doing a good job to counter Al-Qaeda activities.
For the last three or four years, Al-Qaeda tried to attack [inside Yemen] but without any success. We have a number of attempted attacks but the rate of success was very low. So yes, the challenge is there, the environment is there. But I think that Al-Qaeda so far has not really able to establish itself as a major player inside the country.
RFE/RL: You speak about the political instability, rebellion, and separatism in Yemen -- can you elaborate on the internal dynamics of instability in Yemen?
Alani: The government is facing three major challenges and one of them is Al-Qaeda. The second one, which is more serious, is the separatist movement in the south. And then you have the question of the al-Houthi revolt in the north. The Yemeni government believes that although these three groups have no direct alliance between them but they are working on undermining the government's authority and ability.
RFE/RL: There have been numerous reports about the military aid the United Sates has provided Yemen to combat Al-Qaeda. Do you see Yemen turning into a third front against Al-Qaeda after Afghanistan-Pakistan and Iraq?
Alani: I don't see all this happening in Yemen, especially after the two [recent] attacks against Al-Qaeda this Thursday [December 24] and the Thursday before [December 17]. I think these two operations basically scored a good hit against Al-Qaeda's Yemen organization and denied them when they tried to establish a safe haven. So yes, the terrorist group in Yemen is trying, but I think the countermeasures are working at the same time.
RFE/RL: Some reports have suggested that there is a lot of help available to Al-Qaeda from inside Yemen's government. For example, in 2006 some key Al-Qaeda leaders escaped from a maximum security prison in Yemen and they later pulled off attacks. Do you see this as a threat in the future?
Alani: Well, breaks from prison happened in Iraq and Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia and everywhere. But the other side of the story -- the true story of Yemen -- is that out of the 23 [who escaped] in 2006, 20 were either killed or captured. Only three out of the 23 are still free. So, again, it is a success story, it is not a failure story. Even the attack on the American Embassy [in Sanna in September 2008] or the Italian Embassy [in April 2008] or other government institutions were not successful. The attacks on oil instillations were not successful.
RFE/RL: How do you look at the possibility of neighboring Somalia turning into a major sanctuary for Al-Qaeda, considering that the UN Security Council recently imposed sanctions against Eritrea for supporting the Somali Islamist militant group Al-Shabaab, and given that the Somali central government is a lot weaker than in Yemen?
Alani: The environment in Somalia is more encouraging for Al-Qaeda. In Yemen we have a strong army, security services, and strong government as well. But in Somalia we are missing all this -- there is no government, no army, and no security services. So definitely, Somalia can be a candidate for Al-Qaeda; to be transformed as a major center for [Al-Qaeda] activities.